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Preface
For well over a century, there has been a growing concern
about the effects of human actions on the global atmosphere.
Initially, discussion centered on the influence of carbon dioxide
emissions from fossil fuel combustion on climate. In recent years,
numerous further questions have been raised about the effects of
long-term, global-scale changes in the atmosphere.
Many of these issues were raised in congressionrl hearings in
the spring uf 1986, which prompted a request from a group of U.S.
Senators to the National Academy of Sciences for an informative
review of the probler. area (see Appendix A). In response, the
Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate convened a group
of leading experts in a two-day workshop held at the National
Academy of Sciences on October ""J-31, 1986. The workshop pro-
gram was designed to survey in a balanced fashion the state of our
current knowledge about atmospheric changes and their implica-
tions. The workshop participants attempted to identify clearly
the currently available knowledge and understanding that might
be relevant to the development of public .policy. At the same time,
they sought to lay out clearly the limits of our knowledge.
This brief overview document was developed on the basis of
the workshop presentations, and it represents the consensus of the
workshop participants. The summary should thus be viewed as
Preceding page blank 	 ""
a symposium proceedings rather than as a standard NRC report,
which reflects the deliberations and scientific consensus of a care-
fully selected committee over an extended period of study. It is
intended primarily as a background for informative briefings to
be presented to the Congress in response to the original request.
However, the participants hope that it will also prove useful to a
broader audience who share the concerns of the scientific commu-
nity and the Congress for the continued welfare of humanity on a
small but precious planet.
I am most grateful to the workshop participants for their
thoughtful presentations and stimulating discussions at the work-
shop, and for their subsequent contributions to the development
;►f this summary document. I am sure that they also share my
appreciation for the efforts of Dr. John S. Perry and the staff of
the National Research Council's Board on Atmospheric Sciences
and Climate in support of this endeavor.
William D. Nordhaus
Chairman
Workshop on Atmospheric Change
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Introduction
Observations in recent years have revealed unmistakable evi-
dence of increasing emissions and concentrations of a number of
atmospheric trace gases such as carbon dioxide and the chlorofluo-
rocarbons (CFCs). Earlier concerns were heightened by realization
of the growing influence of a range of trace gases on climate and
by the very recent and totally unexpected detection of a major
depletion of stratospheric ozone over the Antarctic that occurs
during the early part of the southern hemisphere spring. Scientific
models indicate that changes in trace gases may lead w major
and troubling changes in global climate, and that worldwide ozone
depletion might produce potentially serious health effects. At a
workshop held at the National Academy of Sciences on October
30-31, 1986, a group of invited experts reviewed these observa-
tions in the context of the current scientific understanding of these
changes and their major implications relevant to policy. This re-
port summarizes the principal conclusions that emerged from the
workshop.
1
Trends in Significant Gases
t`
The concentrations of a number of gases are currently increas-
ing in the atmosphere. While they make up but a tiny fraction of
the atmosphere, they share a number of important characteristics:
They are long-lived, so that they become well mixed
throughout the global atmosphere.
• They are reliably observed to be changing in concentration.
• They interact strongly with thermal radiation and in some
instances with solar --Nation, so that their effects are important
even at low ;,-.,,,,entrations.
Such gases include those listed in Table 1.1. Changes in these
gases on a global scale have been well established by numerous
independent measurements; there is today no doubt about their
increasing concentrations. In addition, ozone in the troposphere
(at concentrations of 10 to 100 parts per billion) may be increasing
at about 1 percent per year, at least in the northern hemisphere.
Stratospheric ozone is highly variable, and systematic global-scale
trends have not been unequivocally established. This review will
focus on those gases most directly linked to human activities, i.e.,
carbon dioxide, ozone, and the chlorofluorocarbons.
Extremely sharp reductions in seasonal minima in strato-
spheric ozone have recently been observed over the Antarctic in
Preceding page blank
TABLE 1.1 Key Atmospheric Trace Gases Whose Concentrations are
Increasing
Gas 1985 Concentration Current Rate of Increase
CO 2 345 parts per million 1.4 ppm/yr 0.4%/yr
CH 1.65 parts per million 18 ppb/yr 1.1%/yr
N20 305 parts per billion 0.6 ppb/yr 0.2%/yr
CFC-11 220 parts per trillion 11 ppt/yr 5%/yr
CFC-12 380 parts per trillion 19 ppt/yr 5%/yr
NOTE: Concentrations are global averages. Rates of increase vary
somewhat from year to year; values here are representative. (Source:
Chapter 3, pp. 56-116 of Atmospheric Ozone 1985. World Meteorological
Organization, Geneva, 1094 pp., 1985b.)
the southern hemisphere during the late winter and early spring
(Septernber-October), while smaller losses have been observed dur-
ing the remainder of the year over the Antarctic. Preliminary
analyses of satellite data suggest stratospheric ozone depletions
of a few percent over the remainder of the globe, but the exis-
tence or extent of global ozone depletion has not yet been firmly
established.
P,
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Sources of the Trace Gases
Although the concentrations of many of the trace gases are
known to vary due to natural causes, it is well established that
many of the current systematic trends in trace gases are caused by
human activities.
Carbon dioxide (C,O Z ) is produced by the combustion of fossil
fuels (coal, oil, and gas), as well as by the conversion of forests
to other uses. Economic activity currently injects about 5 billion
tons of carbon into the atmosphere each year in the form of carbon
dioxide. About half of the emitted carbon dioxide stays in the
atmosphere, with the rest probably being absorbed by the oceans
or taken up in plants. There is no significant doubt that a large
part of the observed increase in carbon dioxide arises from human
activities.
Methane ( "natural gas," or CH,) is produced by a wide vari-
ety of processes, such as bacterial activity in bogs and rice pad-
dies, and in the digestive tracts of animals and insects. Measure-
ments suggest that atmospheric methane is derived mostly from
such biological sources. Although their causes are not well under-
stood, change: in nnethane concentrations correlate plausibly with
changes in world population and agricultural activity. Methane
releases due to coal miring and natural gas usage may also be
important.
6The chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are a group of synthetic com-
pounds used for refrigeration, insulation, foams, and other in-
dustrial purposes, and as propellants for item-, like deodorants.
Although the nonessential use of CFCs as aerosol propellants has
been banned in the United States, Canada, and Scandinavia, their
long atmospheric lifetimes coupled with continued propellant use
in other countries and growth in other applications continue to
produce further increases in atmospheric concentrations. These
gases diffuse into the stratosphere, where they are destroyed by
solar ultraviolet radiation, releas ;ng chlorine, which acts to deplete
stratospheric ozone. The prime concerns are directed toward the
extremely stable CFCs such as CC1 3F (CFC-11), CC12F2 (CFC-
12), and CCl2 FCCIF2 (CFC-13).
Nitrogen oxide (N,,O,) increases arise because of major im-
balances in the natural nitrogen cycle. The long-lived, unreactive
nitrous oxide (N20) is formed naturally by biochemical activity
and anthropogenically from combustion and from the increasing
use of nitrogen fertilizers. The highly reactive nitric oxide (NO)
and nitrogen dioxide (NO2) are formed during the burning of fossil
fuels.
Tropospheric ozone (03), an effective greenhouse gas, although
relatively short-lived in the atmosphere, is observed to be increas-
ing at many locations in the northern hemisphere. Theoretical
models connect ozone increases near the Earth's surface with hy-
drocarbon and nitrogen oxide (NO.) releases, and observed in-
creases in ozone are correlated with vehicular traffic and industrial
activity.
Stratospheric ozone (03 ) is the product of the continuous
interaction of solar ultraviolet radiation with atmospheric oxygen
and is destroyed by a number of chemical processes, incl iding
several of natural origin. It is thought that injections of CFCs will
substantially augment the natural chlorine removal process, with
a progressive depletion of stratospheric ozone.
The reasons for the recently observed Antarctic ozone de-
cline are not completely understood, with urrent theories in-
volving chemical reactions originating witl -"FCs and bromine
compounds, complex dynamic processes, solar variations, or some
combination of these causes. Resolution of these questions will
require observations in the Antarctic stratosphere. With careful
observations, most major uncertainties about the general causes of
ozone changes in Antarctica should be resolved within a few years.
3
Direct Physical Effects of C
Trace Gases
The gases discussed here are called "radiatively active trace
gases" because they affect the Earth's absorption of incoming solar
or outgoing thermal radiation and thus influence both climate and
the penetration to the surface of harmful ultraviolet radiation in
the 280- to 320-nm (UV-B) wavelength range.
All these trace gases absorb thermal radiation from the Earth
and re-emit it both upward to space and downward to the Earth's
surface. The net effect is to warm the temperature of the Earth's
surface through what is called the "greenhouse effect." We already
benefit from the greenhouse effect, for were we not already blan-
keted by the atmosphere, the Earth would be very much colder.
Nor is this simply a theoretical speculation. The effect of trace
gases on radiation is well established from laboratory measure-
ment; satellite observations clearly show that atmospheric gases
are absorbing radiation at the predicted wavelengths; and we
need only examine the extremely high surface temperatures of our
neighboring planet Venus to see the effects of having a dense at-
mosphere of such greenhouse gases. Moreover, the cold climate of
ke last ice age was accompanied by relatively low carbon dioxide
__.counts, and the warm climate of the Cretaceous era may have
been in part due to very high carbon dioxide concentrations.
Until a decade ago, the greenhouse effect of increasing carbon
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dioxide was the primary focus of our attention. However, with
the identification of the strong greenhouse effect of CFC-11 and
CFC-12 in 1975, attention to other gases greatly increased. The
important non-carbon dioxide trace gases are methane, the CFCs,
nitrous oxide, and ozone. Recent studies (e.g., World Meteoro-
logical Organization, 1985a) indicate that increases  in non-carbon
dioxide trace gases in the atmosphere, taken together, are about
as important in warming the Earth as is the increase in carbon
dioxide.
The influence of changes in concentrations of such trace gases
on climate has been investigated by means of numerical models
of various kinds based on our best understanding of the processes
involved. These models have been substantially validated in their
ability to simulate the pattern of contemporary climate and cer-
tain past eras of significantly different climate and can be looked
upon as comprehensive summaries of our present knowledge of the
atmosphere. Because of the enormous physical complexity )f cli-
mate, our imperfect understanding of parts of the climate system,
and the limited computational capability of even the fastest com-
puters, these models will continue to have significant limitations.
Many deficiencies remain in the models, including representation
of such phenomena as ocean circulation, ice and snovv forma-
tion, regional rainfall, clouds, and soil moisture storage. Most of
these deficiencies only reflect the lack of sufficient data to provide
the necessary detailed coverage of the entire globe and cannot
be quickly remedied. The most significant remaining uncertainty,
however, is the treatment of the formation of clouds and how their
number and size might change with the increasing addition of
further greenhouse gases to the atmosphere.
Nevertheless, simulations of the effects of increases in the
greenhouse gases permit a number of plausible inferences to be
drawn with considerable confidence. In most model studies to
date, atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations have been dou-
bled (e.g., from 300 to 600 parts per million) and then maintained
at that concentration until a new equilibrium climate is estab-
lished in the model. We expect such results to apply equally well
to a combination of carbon dioxide and other trace gases where
the total effect on the radiation budget is equivalent to a doubling
of carbon dioxide.
1Some of the possible climate responses to increased green-
house gases are rather well understood; others remain contro-
versial. Listed below, in approximate order of current scientific
confidence, are some important inferences on climate changes due
to increased greenhouse gases drawn from these studies.
• Large : )tratospheric Cooling (virtually certain). Reduced
ozone concentrations in the upper stratosphere will lead to reduced
absorption of Molar ultraviolet radiation and therefore less heating.
Increases in the stratospheric concentration of carbon dioxide and
other radiatively active trace gases will increase the radiation of
heat from the stratosphere. The combination of decreased heating
and increased cooling will lead to a major lowering of temperatures
in the upper stratosphere.
• Global-Mean Surface Warming (very probable). For a dou-
bling of atmospheric carbon dioxide (or its radiative equivalent
from all of the greenhouse gases), the long-term global-mean sur-
face warming is expected to be in the range of 1.5 to 4.5°C. The
most significant uncertainty arises from the effects of clouds. Of
course, the actual rate of warming over the next century will be
governed by the growth rate of greenhouse gases, natural fluctua-
tions in the climate system, and the detailed response of the slowly
responding parts of the climate system, i.e., oceans and glacial ice.
• Global-Mean Precipitation Increase (very probable). In-
creased heating of the surface will lead to increased evaporation
and, therefore, to greater global mean precipitation. Despite this
increase in global average precipitation, some individual regions
might well experience decreases in rainfall.
Reduction of Sea Ice (very probable). As the climate
warms, total sea ice is expected to be reduced.
Polar Winter Surface Warming (very probable). As the sea
ice boundary is shifted poleward, the models predict a dramatically
enhanced surface warming in winter polar regions. The greater
fraction of open water and thinner sea ice will probably lead to
warming of the polar surface air by as much as 3 times the global
mean warming.
Summer Continental Dryness/Warming (likely in the long
term). Several studies have predicted a marked long-term drying
of the soil moisture over some mid-latitude interior continental
regions during summer. This dryness is mainly caused by an
earlier termination of snowmelt and rainy periods, and an earlier
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onset of the spring-to-summer reduction of soil wetness. Of course,
these simulations of long-term equilibrium conditions may not offer
a reliable guide to trends over the next few decades of changing
atmospheric composition and changing cL•mate.
• High-Latitude Precipitation Increase (probable). As the: cli-
mate warms, the increased poleward penetration of warm, moist
air should increase the average annual precipitation in high lati-
tudes.
Rise in Global Mean Sea Level (probable). A rise in mean
sea level is generally expected due to thermal expansion of sea
water in the warmer future climate. Fs: less certain is the contri-
bution due to melting or calving of land ice.
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Current Issues
Because of the complexities of both atmospheric chemistry and
the dynamical processes of the atmosphere itself and because many
chan;es are greatly influenced by human actions, our present abil-
ity to forecast the specifics of future changes is extremely limited.
In this section the uncertainties associated with our knowledge of
current trends and possible future changes are discussed.
OZONE TRENDS AND THE ANTARCTIC OZONE HOLE
Total ozone amounts around the globe have been measured by
ground-based instruments at an internationally coordinated net-
work of stations for the past 30 years, and in a few instances for as
long as 50 to 60 years. Satellite sensors have provided some two-
dimensional measurements since about 1970 and have furnished
ozone data continuously since 1978. These data can be coordinated
with ground-based observations. Low-resolution estimates of the
vertical distribution of ozone are obtained from the ground-based
network and from satellite observations. Balloon-borne instru-
ments occasionally provide high-resolution data concerning the
vertical distribution of ozone. Because of the high natural vari-
ability of ozone concentrations, it has been difficult to validate
models or to detect any systematic trends.
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The discovery of the ozone "hole" in the Antarctic strato-
sphere was a complete surprise to scientists and presents an im-
portant challenge to current models of atmospheric processes. We
are, unfortunately, hampered by the limited observational net-
work, especially in the south polar region, in seeking an explana-
tion of this phenomenon. In the next year or two, research flights
in the Antarctic stratosphere itself will be needed to determine
the mechanisms of the recently observed ozone changes. On a
longer term, continued research and monitoring will be required
to reach an understanding of the processes determining global
ozone concentrations.
CLIMATE CHANGE
Detection of climate changes and validation of the models em-
ployed for climate prediction are closely linked. Our understanding
is severely hampered by the fact that the climate system is cur-
rently in disequilibrium in two respects. First, significant factors
influencing climate, such as trace gas concentrations and surface
characteristics, are known to be changing rapidly as a result of hu-
man actions. Secondly, it is believed that these are inducing slow
changes in the heat content of the ocean and ice masses that may
be significantly impeding and complicating the progress of observ-
able climate changes. Moreover, we know that global climate is
highly variable even in the absence of human influences. Thus,
we cannot yet reliably distinguish with high confidence climate
fluctuations stemming from natural causes from those induced by
human activities.
Confident detection of human influences on climate will re-
quire not only careful monitoring, but also the development of
climate models that can enable us to sort out the effects of other
variables. Among the major factors that impede the effort to de-
tect human influences on contemporary climate are the following:
Solar Radiation. Satellite measurements of total solar radi-
ation have been reliably maintained only since the late-19703 and
show variability in the range of 0.2 to 0.3 percent.
Ocean-Atmosphere Interactions. The ocean serves as a vast
repervoir for both carbon and heat, and is inadequately treated in
ct**Pnt models. Moreover, ocean monitoring is currently inade-
quate for detection of long-term changes.
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Volcanic Disturbances. Volcanic activity often injects large
amounts of aerosols into the high atmosphere that produce tran-
sient and detectable changes in climate, but the extent to which
volcanic activity has influenced contemporary climate variations
over the recent past is uncertain.
• Regional Turbidity Changes. Increases in airborne par-
ticles—such as observed over industrialized areas and over the
Arctic basin--could affect the absorption of solar radiation and
thus influence climate.
Surface Changes. Land use changes alter surface reflectiv-
ity (albedo), along with water uses and flows. The albedo is also
affected by changes in ice and snow cover.
Cloudiness. Clouds are only crudely modeled at present,
and reliable data on cloud distribution are only just becoming
available. Yet changes in the amount, distribution, or optical
characteristics of clouds could powerfully influence climate.
Natural Variability. Even after all known sources of vari-
ability are accounted for, some fluctuations in the climate record
remain unexplained. These may stem from unrecognized variables,
or may simply represent unpredictable components of natural vari-
ability in the climate system.
MONITORING AND DETECTION OF CHANGES IN THE
ATMOSPHERE AND CLIMATE
Careful long-term monitoring of climate is needed not only
for the detection of climate changes, but also for the development
of improved models. Monitoring also permits the early detection
of unanticipated effects such as the Antarctic ozone hole. Since
increases in greenhouse gases and their effects on climate are slow
processes, it is clear that long-term monitoring will be required
to detect effects. Attention should therefore focus on quantities
that have been adequately observed on a global scale, and whose
expected response to greenhouse forcing is well understood. Some
of these are as follows:
• Sea Level. Global warming would be expected to raise sea
level through melting of land-borne ice and thermal expansion of
the ocean's upper layers. A slow rise of 10 to 25 cm has been
observed over the last 100 years.
Upper-Air Temperatures. Only about 40 years of observa-
tions are available. Warming trends in tropospheric temperatures
1.0
Deg.0
0.5
0.0
1850
`U
Globe
1870
	
1890	 1910	 1930	 1950	 1970	 1990
FIGURE 1 Trend in global-mean surface temperature (Jones et al., 1986).
may be discerned >n recent years, together with decreasing strato-
spheric temperatures in the southern hemisphere.
e Surface Temperatures. Recent analyses employing both
marine and t rrestrial data indicate a long-term (100 year) upward
trend in glo', sl mean surface temperature, with a total warming of
about 0.5°C over a century (Figure 1). `WArming appears to have
accelerated in the last few years, with the warmest years of the en-
tire record occurring in the last five years. Earlier studies based on
less complete data sets and employing different analysis methods
yielded somewhat different results, reflecting the inherent difficulty
of estimating a global average from scattered observations.
The above observations are consistent with the hypothesis that
increased greenhouse warming is taking place. However, it must
be pointed out that natural climatic fluctuations are constantly
taking place, and that alternative explanations are available for
each of these observations. For example, changes in ocean circula-
tion could greatly complicate the interpretation of the temperature
record. Thus, the evidence for detection of greenhouse changes,
while quite plausible, is circumstantial in nature. Continued work
on monitoring and development of models will be needed before
human effects on climate can be unequivocably disentangled from
natural variatiuns.
Nevertheless, the convergence of different lines of evidence and
the absence of credible contradictory evidence are in themselves
impressive. The passage of time and the slow accumulation of
observations have not shaken, but rather increased, the credibility
of theories that predict major climatic changes in the future.
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Impacts of Rising Concentrations of Trace
Gases
As we move from observation to prediction, and from analysis
of physical-climate systems to analysis of socioeconomic systems,
the confidence in our understanding and forecasting ability drops
off markedly. Nonetheless, if we are to make reasoned judgments
about public and private steps to adapt to, mitigate, offset, or
prevent changes in atmospheric composition and behavior, we
must attempt to peer into the future and to hazard guesses about
the impacts of changes in the offending trace gases on the world
we live in.
In our analysis, a number of different layers can be separated:
(1) the implications of depletion of ozone; (2) direct effects of
changing climate; (3) impacts through both natural, relatively
unmanaged ecosystems and managed ecosyrteins like agriculture;
(4) direct impacts on other sectors of the socioeconomic system;
(5) impacts on human health; and (6) the vast uncertainties posed
by changing climate.
IMPLICATIONS OF OZONE DEPLETION
Among t.le aoost fully studied implication of A changing at-
mosphere is the effect of decreasing ozone (Environmental Studies
Board, 1984; Titus, 1986; World Meteorological Organization,
15
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1985b). Ozone absorbs radiation strongly in the ultraviolet band,
and light in the UV-B (280 to 320 nm) band has been found to be
absorbed by cells and to be avaociated with diverse and goneraiiy
deleterious biological effects. Depletion of ozone would certainly
increase the intensity of damaging radiation reaching the Earth's
surface. In humans these effects range from mild sunburn to skin
cancer. Exposure to UV-B radiation is the primary cause for Nasal
cell and squamous cell skin cancers, of whit' . ` ere are 300,000 to
400,000 new cases each year in the United States at the present
time. Exposure to UV-B may also play a role in the development
of malignant melanoma, but the causal relationship is less certain
than with the other two forms of skin cancer. In other organisms,
such as certain pla.-its and marine organisms, exposure to UV-B
radiation may adversely affect development and reproductive suc-
cess. In animals, numerous skin diseases are caused or aggravated
by exposure to the sun. Specific effects include immunological
changes and skin cancers (both melanoma and nonmelanoma) in
humans, as well as damage to plants, animals, and marine organ-
isms. Major increases in human skin cancer incidence have been
projected as a result of ozone depletion (Environmental Studies
Board, 1984).
DIRECT IMPACTS OF CLIMATIC CHANGE
At the outset, we must recognize that people care deeply
about the environment in which they live. Major changes in lo-
cal climates—whether they be more prolonged heat waves, fewer
snowstorms, shifting monsoons—would affect the daily lives of
hundreds of millions of people.
We cannot say at this time whether these direct impacts will
pose major or minor burdens on people. Some `optimists" would
downplay the direct importance, noting the slow pace of change,
the enormous ability of people to adapt, and the elide range of
climates in which people already live and thrive; they would also
note the southward migration of Americans in t1:9'sst two decades
and point to surveys indicating people's preference for warmer
climates. After all, people constantly adjust to immense changes
of climate between day and n i ght, summer and winter, and home to
holiday resort. Moreover, t, a world has already- accommodated to
a substantial climatic change from the cold years of the "Little Ice
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Age" of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries to the significantly
warmer climates of today.
Cthers, let us call them "pessimists," would argue that large
areas may be afflicted with markedly unfavorable climates for
example, hotter and drier climates, reduced water supplies, and
a greater number of extreme conditions Like droughts and heat
waves. Simple statistical reasoning suggests that small shifts in
mean values can imply large changes in the frequencies of extreme
events. Indeed, the major impacts of climatic change might arise
from an increased likelihood of extreme events. Pessimists might
further argue that some of our social systems are ill-designed to
cope with a major change toward higher temperatures.
Although many speculative examples may be cited, we have
at present no basis for reliably assessing the net effect of the di-
rect impacts of climate. Nevertheless, given plausible quantitative
estimates of changes in environmental parameters, explorations of
implications for human society would be useful.
IMPACTS THROUGH ECOSYSTEMS
The major social impacts of the rising trace gases will be ef-
fected through the climate changes discussed above. Few doubt
that we have set in motion a train of consequences that include
rising average temperatures, rising sea level, and a major redistri-
bution of local climates. Less secure are the predictions that our
continental climates will be drier, that the central United States
may be significantly more drought-prone as summer soil moisture
drops, and that river systems will see major changes in average
flow patterns—some higher, some lower.
The first area of concern is agriculture, particularly rain-fed
(nonirrigated) agriculture. Studies suggest that there may be
drops in yields of some crops in a warmer and drier climate;
however, the higher carbon dioxide levels are generally thought to
act as a powerful fertilizer for most craps (corn being the major
exception). At present, the average long-term effect of increasing
carbon dioxide concentrations, that is ;
 the yield averaged over
large areas such as Europe or North America, is unpredictable:
increasing carbon dioxide will fertilize plants while climate changes
may hurt them. These competing influences may mask shifting
effects on individual farmers, regions, or even small nations. A
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farmer of Illinois or Kansas, bankrupted by a carbon dioxide-
induced drought, would take little comfort in the higher yields
harvested by Canadian wheat farmers. Similar1f, a wheat farmer
on a desertified plot in Rajasthan held by his family for centuries
would benefit little from the higher rice yields in Taiwan.
The impacts of climatic change on ecosystems other than
agriculture are even more difficult to predict. Evidence suggests a
poleward migration of forest extent, although the time lags may
be on the scale of centuries. Changes may affect fisheries, e.g., by
altering ocean circulation, but the dominant pathways have not
been identified. Inland lakes may rise or fall markedly, and some of
our treasured dams may empty while others spill over. However,
without better regional climate prediction, we cannot now make
forecasts for individual lakes or dams or regions.
Groups who have studied sea-level changes appear more con-
fident about the direction and magnitude of changes this greater
predictability arises because the oceans respond on a global scale
to changes in global climate. Over the last century, sea levels have
risen 10 to 25 cm (4 to 10 in.). Current knowledge suggests a rise in
sea level of 50 to 80 cm (20 to 32 in.) over the next century. Rising
sea levels would increase coastal erosion and cause marked shore-
line recession in vulnerable areas. In estuaries and tidal rivers,
saline water might advance significantly. Cleat ly, these problems
would be particularly unwelcome for those low-lying areas (e.g.,
the coastal United States, the Netherlands, and Bangladesh) that
,are particularly vulnerable to spring tides and storm surges.
OTHER SOCIOECONOMIC PACTS
The bulk of economic activity as measured by gross output
originating-97 percent for the United States and 93 percent for
the world—is in sectors other than agriculture, forestry, and fish-
eries. In terms of direct effects (that is, those directly affecting
productive processes as opposed to those indirectly affecting pro-
duction through purchased materials or services), these activities
can be divided into those modestly affected by climatic changes
and those negligibly affected.
Those experiencing modest direct effects, accounting for ap-
proximately 30 percent of U.S. GNP, include construction, trans-
portation, energy systems, and recreation activities. To take the
V.
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first as an example, construction will be affected because the sea-
sons impose a distinct annual cycle on building activities, with
reduced levels of activity taking place in frosty periods. Hence,
where construction seasons are short, changes in the length of the
warm season can have major effects. By contrast, unless snow-
making could come to the rescue, skiers could find their favorite
mountains offering shorter ski seasons.
Most of the U.S. economy would in a direct way be negligibly
affected by the changes outlined above. As an extreme example,
cardiac surgery takes place in artificially controlled climates, and
changes in the natural climate of the kind foreseen would have
little direct effect on operating conditions. Similar effects would
obtain for underground mining, most manufacturing activities,
communications, financial services, and many government activi-
ties.
It must be emphasized that this untroubled outlook for the
bulk of economic activity in advanced economies would hold only
if the general economic climate does not deteriorate in a major
way. Should rapid breakdowns in ecologically related sectors spill
over into the general economy, the outlook would have to be more
guarded. Could drastic changes in water availability produce "wa-
ter shocks" similar in magnitude to the "oil shocks" of the 1970s?
Or, as some think more likely, would the pace of change be suffi-
ciently slow that our social and economic structures could adapt
readily to the changing ecosystems in which they are embedded?
Answers to these "sys.ems" questions involve a most complex web
4 ecosystem-econonuc interactions and are beyond the ability of
current social science to predict with confidence.
IMYACTS ON HUMAN HEALTH
Suggestive relationships between climate variations and hu-
man health indicators can readily be identified. For example,
mortality from many diseases has a seasonal pattern. However,
long-term climatic changes in temperate latitudes are unlikely to
have major health implications. More troubling might be the
expansion of tropical climates and the concurrent expansion of
the ranges of tropical disease vectors. Such changes would mostly
affect developir!, countries that already face daunting health prob-
lems. Effects of increased ultraviolet radiation due to ozone deple-
tion have been noted above.
I	 1Z	
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UNPREDICTABLE OUTCOMES
Among the sources of heightened concerns in recent years are
a number of troubling but largely unpredictable factors:
We are pushing our climate and environment—the sur-
roundings in which we live, work, and play—into a region literally
unexperienced during the history of homo sapiens. To find a cli-
mate as warm on the average as that projected for a century hence,
we would have to go back many millions of years. Moreover, the
rates of change of our climate are likely to be larger than any
documented changes.
The systems producing the climatic change are ones with
tremendous inertia. Once injected into the atmosphere, the in-
creased CFCs and nitrous oxide concentrations have lifetimes of
around a century, while increased carbon dioxide concentrations
would take many centuries to return to their preindustrial values.
Moreover, the underlying technologies, particularly our energy
systems, are ones that are deeply embedded in our society; they
change slowly, as we see by the fact that only one wholly new en
ergy form (nuclear power) has been introduced in the last century.
Similarly, many elements of our infrastructure, e.g., dams, and
seaports, have extremely long lifetimes. If we make mistakes, we
will have to live with them for a long time.
• Most important, we are reluctant to accept a reassur-
ing forecast for a warmer globe because of imponderables. We
know that major changes are likely to produce major unforeseen
consequences—indeed the unforecasted Antarctic ozone hole may
be just such an example of an unforeseen consequence of changes
acting on a complex system.
One might speculate about a host of other possible unfore-
seen consequences such as the following: In a high-carbon dioxide
world, would we be overrun by carbon dioxide-fertilized weeds?
Or would pests become more virulent? Would some traumatic cli-
matic response be triggered as temperatures rise above historical
experience, perhaps a response triggered by melting ice and snow?
Would deserts insidiously spread to envelop major populated ar-
eas or croplands? Would the West Antarctic icepack calve, raising
sea levels by up to 20 feet? (This is currently considered highly
unlikely within the next few hundred years.) Would the higher
temperatures lead to melting of the Arctic icepack in summer and
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produce major unpredictable changes in weather patterns of the
northern hemisphere? Would small shifts in the courses of ocean
currents produce major changes in regional climates?
Will rapid CFC growth trigger an ozone collapse? Are there
unknown impacts of changing concentrations of ozone at the sur-
face or in the upper atmosphere on plants, animals, or people?
Will higher bombardment of plants and animals by ultraviolet ra-
diation produce unanticipated health effects? Is there an unfore-
seen interaction among higher tropospheric temperatures, lower
stratospheric temperatures, and rising concentrations of various
chemical compounds? Will rapidly changing climate patterns pro-
duce tensions spilling over to political and military conflicts?
This list could be extended indefinitely, yet we still suspect
that many unforeseen consequences will remain uncovered even by
these speculative forays.
6
Do We Know Enough to Act?
CURRENT RESEARCH AND VIEWS
In its 1983 report, the National Research Council's Carbon
Dioxide Assessment Committee summarized its judgment of the
issue as follows:
Overall, we find in the carbon dioxide issue reason for concern,
but not panic. Although the prospect of historically unprecedented
climatic changes is troubling, the problems that may be associated
with it are of quite uncertain magnitude, and both climate change
and increased carbon dioxide may also bring benefits. . . . In
our judgment, the knowledge we can gain in coming years shouln
be more beneficial than a lac": of action will be damaging; a
program of action without a r rogram for learning could be costly
and ineffective. . . . (0)ur recommendations call for "research,
monitoring, vigilance, and an open mind."
In the years since the Changing Climate report, the scientific
community's perception of the issue has indeed evolved substan-
tially along the lines envisaged by its authors. It was felt that, as
time passed and information accrued, the center of concern would
slowly shift from study of scientific questions toward exploration
of policy implications and options. This evolution has indeed oc-
curred. As noted above, the continued intensive refinement of the
observational record has yielded a steady convergence of highly
23
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suggestive circumstantial evidence that major climatic changes
are indeed in progress. Major national and international research
efforts in climate have greatly improved our understanding of the
climate system's behavior, and have reinforced the concerns first
voiced by scientists over a century ago. The U.S. Department of
Energy (1985) has published a massive compendium of its research
program's results; a comprehensive international assessment has
been conducted under the auspices of a group of international iii-
tergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (the World
Meteorological Organization, the United Nations Environment
Program, and the International Council of Scientific Unions); and
a standing international Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases has
been established.
This intensive worldwide effort has reaffirmed the earlier judg-
ments and revealed no credible contrary indications. The tone of
this evolution is indicated by the following excerpt from the re-
port of the international assessment in the fall of 1985 ( World
Meteorological Organization, 1985x):
... (T)he understanding of the greenhouse question is sufficiently
de oped that scientists and policy-makers should begin an active
collaboration to explore the effectiveness of alternative policies and
adjustments.
SHOULD WE ACT NOW?
The litany of uncertainties enumerated above is not intended
to paralyze the decisionmaker. Rather, it should remind us of
the enormous difficulties faced by those who wish to take action
now, not later. Moreover, in reminding ourselves of the remaining
uncertainties, we should not lose sight of the enormous amount
we have learned in very recent years—not only about climate, but
also about the human influences on climate. We have learned,
for example, that exponential growth in fossil fuel consumption is
not inexorable--carbon dioxide emissions from combustion were
virtually unchanged from 1973 to 1985. We have not only learned
that other trace gases are powerful influences on climate; we have
also learned much about the possibilities for their control, e.g., by
technological substitution and regulation in the case of the CFCs.
Indeed, it is possible that our demonstrated ability to change
the global atmosphere presages a future capability to manage it
to our advantage. The potential fr.- callective action leading to
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improving our global climate faces numerous obstacles, however,
for such action is the product of the combined effect of the individ-
ual actions of many nations. Control of emissions or hypothetical
future management of the atmosphere and climate would require
protracted reliable cooperation on a global scale that is unprece-
dented in the political history of nations.
But when should we act? Now? In a year? In a decade? In a
century? We do not presume to answer such a value-laden ques-
tion. Rather, we pose it in an alternative fashion by asking, "How
much are we likely to learn in the near future?" Is a future panel
likely to find a "smoking gun," concluding beyond a reasonable
doubt that what are now seen as potential impacts are instead so
likely or so threatening that a course of action is unequivocably
obvious? Our tentative view on this question is the following:
• There is without question a rapid buildup of trace atmo-
spheric gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, and the CFC:
In addition, the depletion of ozone over the Antarctic in the last
few years is confirmed by statistically significant and independent
measurements.
• There is a high degree of confidence in the basic proposi-
tions about the effects of trace gases, both on global climate and
on ozone depletion. Put differently, it would be very surprising if a
National Research Council panel a few years hence pronounced the
underlying proposit ;ons put forth here about climate and ozone
depletion dead wrong.
At the same time, the quantitative magnitudes and timing
of effects are moderately uncertain. Whether globally averaged
temperatures will rise a degree or several degrees by the middle of
the twenty-first century, what the exact extent of ozone depletion
will be by 2020, whether sea level will rise a foot or several feet over
the next century—these are events about which we are confident
with respect to the direction, but not to the exact magnitude.
We have little confidence in predictions about many details
of the forecasts: local changes by city or state, exact shifts of desert
regions or of extent of monsoons .
 changes in river flows, or overall
economic impacts.
• It seems likely that the impacts of climatic change will fall
most severely on immovable, and therefore inflexible, elements of
both natural and man-made infrastructures. These include water
systems (rivers, dams, and irrigation projects), marine and coastal
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structures, and agricultural systems. In addition, national parks
and biosphere reserves are usually established to preserve some
asset of unique physical or biological importance, often depend on
climatic factors, and cannot be easily moved or replaced.
We are on the whole confident that changes of the antici-
pated magnitude will produce major unforeseen consequences—in
climate, in ecosystem responses, in human responses, and in local
or national economic impacts. We are confident that these im-
pacts pose generally greater risks for poor countries, which largely
depend on natural ecosystems and lack resources to insulate them-
selves from climate shifts, than for wealthy nations. But whether
the consequences will in the end prove grave or only modest, and
on whom the consequences will fall, we cannot say. Moreover, we
doubt whether the full range of the unanticipated consequences
can be fathomed until they are well upon us.
In the short run, the most prudent scientific response is to
strengthen our commitment to basic and applied sciences with an
eye to improving our understanding of these phenomena and n' eir
impacts on our society and its environment. Our ability to under-
stand this enormously complex physical-biological-social system
rests ultimately on the base of deep understanding of the basic sci-
entific relationships. (For example, the major discovery of recent
years, the Antarctic ozone hole, was made by basic scientists in
routine monitoring.) Important activities would involve continued
and enhanced national and international investment in knowledge
about theories, modeling, and observation of atmospheric chem-
istry, climate systems, ecosystems, and socioeconomic responses.
This investment in basic science might be coupled with investi-
gation of new technologies that would mitigate the buildup of
atmospheric trace gases, particularly focusing on the non-carbon
dioxide trace gases.
o Consideration of more direct policy actions might best start
with the CFCs. They are uncommonly powerful greenhouse gases,
their effect on stratospheric ozone is well established, and they are
entirely man-made. National and international policies to limit
CFC emissions should be carefully weighed.
Although we did not investigate in detail the costs and
benefits of alternative policies, many of the workshop participants
believe that steps should be taken now to slow emissions or mit-
igate the potential impacts of the rising atmospheric trace gases
discussed in the workshop. While individual participants might
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differ on the exact timing and stringency of such steps, all of the
participants believe that a thorough study of the impacts of and
appropriate responses to rising atmospheric trace gases is among
the most pressing issues on the national research agenda.
This report has focused on the issues surrounding the pre-
sentation and interpretation of the data and theories about the
increasing concentrations of atmospheric trace gases. As has been
here emphasized, this subject involves enormously complex ques-
tions of understanding dynamic processes and forecasting future
trends and their physical, social, and economic implications. With
this appraisal, we come to the frontier between science and policy
and stop there. On the other side of the frontier lies the even more
complex task of weighing social priorities and deciding how to act;
that task has been left to those for whom this report is written.
In transmitting this report, however, we also would convey our
belief that the problem of rising trace gases will prove to be one
of the major problems faced by human society in the decades to
come, and one that should now be weighed with deliberate care by
the world's political leaders and, indeed, by all who are concerned
with the stewardship of our planet.
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June 2, 1986
Dr. frank Press
President
National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20418
Dear Frank:
This is to request the assistance of the National Academy of
Sciences in developing and coordinating and conducting a workshop
on the possible consequences of fundamental changes in the
world's atmosphere caused by the use of fossil fuels, increasing
levels of carbon mon oxide and other greenhouse gases, and other
industrial activiti,•..
Trad i tionally, the Academy has served the Congress and the
public in interpreting difficult scientific and technical issues,
and especially in helping us understand the risks associated with
them. For several years, we have known that the atmosphere of
the planet was being altered by human activities. But recently,
the statements from segments of the scientific community have
evinced an unprecedented level of alarm. There have been
suggestions that the future of mankind itself could literally be
at stake in this extraordinarily complex scientific debate.
Frankly, if the risks are truly this great--and this has
certainly been implied in recent reports and meetings--it is
extraordinarily important for the Congress, the press and the
public to understand this. On the other hand, overstating the
risks, or doing so prematurely, would be a great disservice. It
is for this reason that we are requesting your help and that of
the Academy.
We are deeply disturbed that neither other Members of the
Congress nor the press seem to be aware of some of the most
extraordinary statements over made by respected and reputable
scientists and scientific organizations. Only one example of
this is a statement contained in a recent State-of-The-Azt report
on the carbon dioxide problem issued by the Department of Energy
as follows:
Human effects on atmospheric composition and the size and
operations of the terrestrial ecos ystems represent major
excursions that may yet overwhelm the life-support system
crafted in nature over billions of years.
yr -
Another recent statement, issued by LSO scientists from a
dozen different nations, me4tinq under the auspices of the World
M.p teorologicsl Society and the United Nations Environment
Program, warned that man may induce "a rise of global mean
temperature... which is greeter than any in man's history
conducting a "global experiment" with the Earth's atmosphere.
Frankly, we are accustomed to conservative, cautious
statements from the scientific community. Remarks such as those
we have just cited, made in official documents, indicate that at
least some segments of the scientific community bel!eve that the
risk posed to mankind and the plant's environment may be of
immense and unprecedented proportions.
It is for this reason that we are asking for the assistance
of the Academy in collecting and analyzing this data, as well as
communicating it to the Congress and the public ic. an
understandable way. One option would be to conduct a one or two
day workshop for Members of Congress, their staffs, and the
press, which would identify research priorities and evaluate
current e%idence. Members of the staff of the Committee on
Environment and Public Works have discussed these issues with
Dr. Devra Davis of the Board on Environmental Studies and
Toxicology. If you are agreeable, they could continue to develop
the details of a process for the conduct of appropriate and
follow- up activities. We would be pleased to contact appropriate
organizations to provide funding.
Thank you in advance for your consideratioi ^ f this request.
If we may be of any assistance or provide further information,
please feel free to call upon us.
Sincerely,
Ge r e JL Mitchell
- f!!! -17" ^ ; atrlck Leahy
Robe t T. Sta or
4& Ve D
Max Baucus
Albert Gore, Jr.
J ,^
Appendix B
Current Issues in Atmosphe
Workshop:
Program and Attenc
WORKSHOP PROGRAA
Thursday, October 30, 1986
1:00 p.m. 1. Opening Remarks
Frank Press, NAS
Robert M. White, NAE
William D. Nordhaus, Ya
1:30 p.m.	 2.
2:15 p.m.	 3.
3:00 p.m.
3:15 p.m.	 4.
Observed Trends in Atmo
Ralph J. Cicerone, NCAI
Implications for Ozone D
F. Sherwood Rowland, U
BREAK
Current and Projected Future Ozone Levels
Michael C. McElroy, Harvard
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4:00 p.m. 5.	 Implications for Global Climate
Robert Cess, SUNY
4:45 p.m. 6. Prediction of Changing Regional Climate
Jerry Mahlman, NOAA f GFDL
5:30 p.m.	 INFORMAL RECEPTION
Friday, October 31, 1986
8:30 a.m.	 7.	 Uncertain' ;	 .-'-ction of Climatic Change
V. Ram .	 _. ,	 .- -; ty of Chicago
9:15 a.m. 8.	 Obser
Thom` :.	 ;r	 .- .st Anglia
10:00 a.m. BREAK
10:15 a.m. 9.	 Economic and Social Implications
Stephen H. Schneider, NCAR
Lester B. Lave, Carnegie-Mellon Univ.
11:45 a.m. 10.	 Summary and Synthesis
William D. Nordhaus, Yale
12:45 p.m.	 WORKING LUNCH
(Invited Participation)
2:00 p.m.
	 Planning for Congressional Briefing and
Development of Workshop Statement
(Invited Participation)
4:00 p.m.
	 ADJOURN
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P.O. Box 3000
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James H. Giggins Professor of
Economics
Graduate School of Industrial
Administration
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Pittsburgh, PA 15213
Dr. Jerry Mahlman
Geophysical Fluid Dynamics
Laboratory
NOAA
Princeton University
P.O. Box 308
Princeton, NJ 08542
Prof. Michael B. McElroy
Center for Earth and Planetary
Physics
Pierce Hall, Room 100B
Harvard University
29 Oxford Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Department of Geophysical Sciences
University of Chicago
5734 South Ellis Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
Prof. F. Sherwood Rowland
Department of Chemistry
University of California-Irvine
Irvine, CA 92717
Dr. Stephen H. Schneider
National Center for Atmospheric
Research
P.O. Box 3000
Boulder, CO 80307-3000
Dr. Tom M.L. Wigley
Attn: ESIG
National Center for Atmospheric
Research
P.O. Box 3000
Boulder, CO 80307-3000
Congr-
Dr. Xan A'axander
394 Russell Building
Washington, DC 20510
Me. Linda Cartwright
Environmental and Energy
Study Conferance
House Annex 2, Room 515
Washington, DC 20515
Mr. James Cubie
Subcommittee on HUD/
Independent Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Mr. Philip Cummings
Committee on Environment and
Public Works
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
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Mr. Eric Erdheim
Subcommittee on Natural Resources,
Agriculture Research do Environment
Committee on Science and Technology
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Mr. Jim Greene
Subcommittee on Transportation,
Aviation and Materials
Committee on Science and Technology
U.S. House of Representatives
2320 Rayburn HOB
Washington, DC 20515
Mr. John Justus
Congressional Research S.-rvice-SPRD
Library of Congress (LM-413)
Washington, DC 20540
Mr. Jerolde R. Mande
Legislative Assistant
Office of the Hon. Albert Gore, _'..
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Mr. Joseph McGowan
Congressional Clearing House
on the Future
155 House Annex 2
Washington, DC 20515
Mr. Curtis A. Moore
Committee on Environment and
Public Works
SD-410 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg.
U.S. Senate
Washington, DO 20510
Dr. Robert E. Palmer
Committee on Science and Technology
House of Representatives (H2-388)
Washington, DC 20515
Dr. Alan Robock
Office of the Honorable Bill Green
1110 Longworth
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
I.dr. Steven Shimberg
Committee on Environment and
Public Works
SD-410 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg.
U.S. Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Mr. William S. Smith
Committee on Science and Technology
2321 Rayburn Building
Washington, DC 20515
Agency Representatives
Dr. Eugene W. Bier,y
National Science Foundation
1800 G Street, NW, Room 644
Washington, DC 20550
Dr. J. Michael Hall
NOAA O/AR (Room 817)
6010 Executive Blvd.
Rockville, MD 20852
Dr. Alan D. Hecht
NOAA/NCPO, Code CP
Rockwall Building, Room 108
11400 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852
Mr. Frederick A. Koomanoff
Director
Carbon Dioxide Research Division
Office of Basic Energy Sciences
Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20545
Dr. Robert A. Schiffer
NASA Headquarters (EE)
600 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20546
Dr. Dennis A. Tirpak
Director
Office of Anticipatory Research
(RD-675)
Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20460
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Dr. Robert Watson
NASA Headquarters (Code EE)
600 Independence Ave., SW, Rm.
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Washington, DC 20546
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Mr. Jesse Ausubel
Director, Program Office
National Academy of Engineering
(NAS 310)
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
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Mr. James Davis
Science and Policy Associates, Inc.
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Dr. Donald Hornig
School of Public Health
Harvard University
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World Resources Institute
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Dr. Frank Press
President
National Academy of Sciences
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